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RECENT DECISIONS
privilege" 2 granted by the legislature. To reap the benefits of this
privilege, the plaintiff must comply strictly with its requirements.
"If the terms imposed are not met, the privilege is at ari end." 24 The
Court also, on the facts, extends the decision of the Riatkowsky case.
Where, in that case, the court cancelled a second notice in the same
action,-here the Court has said that a second notice may not be filed
where the plaintiff abandons all prior proceedings and -begins anew in
a different court.
This result, however, would seem to be necessary, since,, without
.it, the law as expressed in the Ratkowsky case.-.puld.be easily cir-
cumvented. Although the plaintiff in this case-,.apareptly failed to
make service solely through his own neglect, the penalty seems harsh.
Justice might better be served by amending th lis pendens statutes
to require filing of a bond, similar in purpose and effect to the bond
necessary for issuance of warrants of attachment.25 Then the.plaintiff
would be penalized for his neglect by forfeiture, of the bond but would
not lose the privilege of filing a lis pendens.
S ECiAL LEGISLATION - OPTIoNAL AmENDMENT TO UNIFORM
UP-S rATE JuRy LAw UP uELD.-Plaintiff brought a tax-payer's suit
to restrain defendant-officers of Albany County from applying the
jrovisions of the so-called 1954 "Uniform Up-State .Juiy. Law," as
amended in 1955.1 The amendment nide the uniform regulations of
the 1954 statute optional with counties of less than 100,000 population.
The plaintiff contended that the statute, as amended, violates New
York constitutional provisions which (1) forbid local or private laws
in establishing juries 2 and (2) restrict them when related to county
23 Israelson v. Bradley, 308 N.Y. 511, 516, 127 N.E2d 313, 315 (1955).
24 Ibid.25 Section 819 of the New York Civil Practice Act provides in part that
"Except where security is expressly dispensed with by statute, such an order
or warrant shall not be granted unless the party applying therefor gives se-
curity for the protection of the party against whom or whose property the order
or warrant is to be directed." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 819.
Section 907 provides in part that "The undertaking to be given on the part
of the plaintiff, before the granting of the warrant [of attachment], shall be
to the effect that if the defendant recovers judgment, or if the warrant- is
vacated, the plaintiff will pay all costs which may be awarded to the defendant
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, not ex-
ceeding the sum specified in the undertaking." Id. § 907.
1N.Y. JuD. LAw §§ 650-85 (Supp. 1955), as amended, N.Y. JuD. LAw§§ 500-31 (Supp. 1956).2
"The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill in any of the follow-ing cases:
"Selecting, drawing, summoning or empaneling grand or petit jurors."
N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 17.
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government. 3 Sustaining the lower court, the Court of Appeals found
that the amendment is not a local but a general law, reasonably classi-
fying the subject matter, and therefore held that the statute did not
conflict with the constitution. Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74,
133 N.E.2d 817 (1956).
Since 1846, the abuses of special legislation have necessitated con-
stitutional prohibitions and limitations.4  However, it is difficult to
determine whether a statute is general or whether it relates to par-
ticular persons or places. At first the courts construed Article III,
Section 17,5 as allowing laws general in terms, to form a class which
may be very small.6 The courts also declined to inquire into the
actual effect of the statute,7 thus apparently authorizing legislation
with such restricted application that it failed only to mention names.
In 1898, the decision in Matter of Henneberger 8 struck down a
road improvement law, which required seven conditions to enter the
class affected. The court laid down the principles that conditions
must be "common to a class" 9 and the court will act "when a willful
and impolitic . . . purpose to evade the constitutional mandate is to
be seen through the transparent device." 10 That such judicial
perspicacity was not to be widely employed was soon evidenced in
People v. Dunn "1 upholding a jury law applicable only to counties
over 500,000, where the facts in Henneberger were described as
3 "No law which shall be special or local in its terms or in its effect, or
which shall relate specially to one county only, shall be enacted by the legis-
lature unless (a) upon the request of the board of supervisors or other elective
governing body of each county to be affected, or, in any county having an
alternative form of government providing for an elective county executive
officer [with such officers' concurrence or a two-thirds majority of the board
of supervisors] . . . or (b) upon a certificate of necessity by the governor
[reciting the facts with concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of the legis-
lature]. . . ." N.Y. CoNSr. art. IX, § 1(b).
4 See N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 15, 17; art. IX, §§ 1(b), 11, 16.
The greatest evil was the inability of the legislators to examine and eval-
uate the vast numbers of special bills. See Governor John T. Hoffman, Annual
Message to The Legislature, January 2, 1872, 6 MESSAGES FaoM! THE GOVERNORS
399, 400, 402 (1909); 2 LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTRY VOF NEw YORK
493-501. (1905).
5 See note 2 supra.
6 See Matter of Church, 92 N.Y. 1, 4-5 (1883), where the class affected
consisted of ". . . every county in the State, having within its bobndaries a
city of one hundred thousand inhabitants, and territory beyond the city limits
mapped into streets and avenues." Id. at 5. See also Matter of N.Y. Elevated
Ry., 70 N.Y. 327, 353 (1877).
7 See Matter of Church, supra note 6, at 5; Matter of N.Y. Elevated Ry..
supra note 6. at 351.
8 155 N.Y. 420, 50 N.E. 61 (1898).
9 Id. at 426, 50 N.E. at 62.
"O Id. at 430, 50 N.E. at 64.
11 157 N.Y. 528, 52 N.E. 572 (1899). "... [T]he exception [Hennebergerl
was so narrowed by distinctions that it became of negligible value." Matter of
Mayor of New York (Elm St.), 246 N.Y. 72, 76, 158 N.E. 24, 25 (1927).
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"remarkable" 12 and decided "upon its special circumstances." 1s The
prospective nature of population requirements allowing counties to
enter the class on attaining a certain size was also stressed in justify-
ing the classification.14 In the same year concerning another statute
with very limited application, 5 it was said "this statute is general in
form... and, hence, on its face, it is a general bill within the mean-
ing . . as used in the Constitution... ." 16 Henneberger was said
to have found evidence in the statute itself without "... . going outside
of the statute to inquire into the motives inducing legislation." 17
Since then statutes have been sustained, applying only to cities of
over one million 18 or enlarging extension privileges to New York
corporations which for five years previous have owned and operated
stage lines in cities of the first class (New York and Buffalo at that
time) .19
However, with the passage of City Home Rule,2 in Matter of
the Mayor of New York (Eln St.)21 the doctrine of the earlier cases
was criticized. Calling Henneberger "the germ of a doctrine more
adapted to realities," 22 the court relied on the language of this new
amendment, as requiring inquiry into the actual effect of the law re-
viving city condemnation awards, which had been barred within the
year previous. In invalidating it, it was set forth that the classifica-
tion must have a reasonable basis, and not be an arbitrary selection.
Seventeen years later in Stapleton v. Pinckney, 3 the court passed
on a jury law which classified counties by population. Henneberger
and the Eln St. case were rephrased by coupling a strong presumption
of constitutionality with the need for a reasonable connection between
the class restrictions and local conditions. The court did not find
... that such local conditions are in any way related to the circum-
12 People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 540, 52 N.E. 572, 576 (1899).
13 Ibid.
14 Id. at 541, 52 N.E. at 576.
15 See Kittinger v. Buffalo Traction Co., 160 N.Y. 377, 54 N.E. 1081 (1899),
upholding a statute validating consents given by 1st and 2d class cities, between
December 1, 1895 and February 1, 1896, to street railway companies which
have failed to obtain certain certificates.
16 Id. at 395-6, 54 N.E. at 1087.
17 Id. at 397, 54 N.E. at 1088.
18 See Ahern v. Elder, 195 N.Y. 493, 88 N.E. 1059 (1909); Stapleton v.
Pinckney, 293 N.Y. 330, 335, 57 N.E.2d 38, 40 (1944) (dictum). But see
Osborne v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4 N.E.Zd 289 (1936).
19 City of New York v. Fifth Avenue Coach Co., 237 App. Div. 383, 262
N.Y. Supp. 228, aff'd per curiam, 262 N.Y. 481, 188 N.E. 29 (1933).
20 "The legislature shall act in relation to the property, affairs or govern-
ment of any city only by general laws which shall in terms and in effect apply
alike to all cities . .. [except for special circumstances]." N.Y. CoNsT. art.
IX, § 11 (emphasis added). The original provision (1924) was negative in
form prohibiting special or local laws on similar terms.
21246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24 (1927).
22 Id. at 76, 158 N.E. 25.
23 293 N.Y. 330, 57 N.E.2d 38 (1944).
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stance that Albany County has a population of more than 200,000 and
less than 250,000 and contains a city with a population of 125,000." 24
By holding the law unconstitutional it was strongly intimated that in-
quiry into the actual effect of the statute was authorized under Article
III, Section 17, as well as the Home Rule provisions.
The "Uniform Up-State Jury Law," passed after years of effort
and documentation,2 5 proposed to cie certain deficiencies including
(1) inadequate jury lists with only'hssessment rolls as a mandatory
source of names, (2) divided 'and uncertain responsibility and
(3) confusingly large numbers of local laws.26  In the instant case,
the dissent found the amendment's classification unreasonable, observ-
ing that it allows a revival of two of these deficiencies,2 7 at the instance
of dubious suggestions of increased costs.&28 That six 'of the forty-two
counties affected have populations between 85,000 and 100,000 was
also pointed out as evidence of the capriciousness of the classification.
24 Stapleton v. Pinckney, 293 N.Y. 330, 336,-57 N.E2d 38, 40 (1944).
5. See 20 REE. N.Y. JUDicLk CouNcil 60-65, 153-216 (1954) ; 9 REP. N.Y.
JuDicxAL CouNCIL 46 (1943) ; 8 REP. N.Y. J DicL'AL COUNCIL 191-242 (1942) ;
7 REP. N.Y. JUDIcIAL COUNCL 151-200 (1941); N.Y. STATE CamE Commis-
SION, 3d Rioxer 11-12 (May 4, 1953); Governor:Thomas R_ Dewey, Annual
Message to The Legislature, January 6, 1954, 1954 N.Y. LEnis. ANNUAL 312,
318; Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Memorandum Approving Uniform Up-State
Jury System, 1954 N.Y. LEnis. ANNUAL 388.2 8 See 20 REP. N.Y. JfiIAL CouNciL. 62 (1954); Governor Thomas E.
Dewey, .jupra note 25.
27The amendment leaves the Uniform Act mandatory on only 15 counties
and makes it optional with 42 counties. Farrington v. Pinckney, 1 N.Y.2d 74,
96, 133 N.E.2d 817, 832 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
The original Uniform Act provided: "The commissioner ... may consult
the latest census enumeration, the latest published ... [directories, assessment
rolls, voters registry] and any other general source of names. There shall be
continuous search for persons qualified . .. in order to obtain as many pros-
pective jurors as necessary and in order to limit as much as possible repetition
of jury service.
"Each public officer of the county [and cities,. towns and villages] . . .
shall . . . at all times furnish to the commissioner [of Jurors] . . . all the
information within his control to enable the commissioner to procure the
names.. . " N.Y. Jun. LAw art. 18, § 658 (Supp. 1956) (emphasis added).
The difference between the above and the correspondini portion of the
amendment is apparent.
".... [Tihe town officers described in section five hundred two [mayors,
assessors etc.] shall consult the last assessment roll of the town, and may
consult the latest census enumeration [further enumerating directories, voters'
registry etc.] . . . ." N.Y. Jun. LAw art. 16, § 503 (Supp. 1956) (emphasis
added).
28"[The Uniform Law] . . . mandatfes] increase [sic] costs (estimated
in my county Wayne, ten to fifteen thousand to establish Commissioner of
Juror Division)." Hon. Mildred Taylor, Memorandum Accompanying The
Amendment to Uniform Up-State Jury Law, 1955 N.Y. Lnmis. ANNUAL 53, 54.
'In small counties which are not financially able to provide for a full time
commissioner, any county official may be designated commissioner on a part
time basis." Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Memorandunr Approving Uniform
Up-State Jury Law, supra note 25.
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The majority answered this by citing a great deal of statute and case
law, to show that classification by population is valid and well en-
trenched by precedent. Following the test in the Stapleton case, the
Court did find a reasonable connection, in that the legislature was ap-
parently segregating the smaller counties according to varying eco-
nomic resources, based on population. But it was also emphasized
that ".... where the reference to population serves only to designate
and identify the place... it will be deemed a local act." 2
By inquiring into the actual effect of the law to hold it valid under
Article III, Section 17, thus apparently abolishing the significance of
the old distinction between the terms and the effect, the scope of judi-
cial investigation was extended and the rationale of the Stapleton case
clarified. However, although the ban against designation as opposed
to classification gives some criteria, the Court's insistence that only
"some reasonable and possible basis" 30 need be found, leaves a very
difficult test. The fine line of distinction between the presumed pos-
sible basis and the results of a vivid imagination is, and will be, very
difficult for the courts to apply.
ToRTs-LBEL AND SrNDER-OuiAL AccusATioN OF COMMU-
NISm NOT SrANR PER S -An engineer- brought an action for
slander against his employer, a corporation engaged in the manufac-
ture of implements for the United States Government. The complaint
alleged that the defendant's president spoke words falsely accusing the
plaintiff of being a communist. The Court of Appeals held that the
words spoken are not slanderous per se and absent a sufficient allega-
tion of special damages, the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Gurtler v. Union Parts Mfg. Co., 1 N.Y2d 5, 132 N.E2d 889 (1956).
It has generally been held that a falsely written accusation of
communism is libelous 1 and actionable per se.2 Courts have reached
this decision by taking judicial notice of the current climate of
opinion,3 while others have sustained the action on statutes making
party membership a bar to governmental employment 4 However, the
29 Farrington v. PincIMey, 1 N.Y.2a 74, 81, 133 N.E2d 817, 822 (1956).
so Id. at 89, 133 N.E2A at 828.
I Libel is actionable without proof of special damages if it- tends to expose
a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory
opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number of the community or tQ
disparage him in the way -of his office, trade or profession. See Mencher v.
Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E2.d 257 (1947) ; Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc.,
309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860 (1956).
2 See, e.g., Wright v. Farm Journal, Inc., 158 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1947);
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
3 See Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E2d 257 (1947).
4 Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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